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Abstract: This article puts the self-interest hypothesis to an empirical test by 
analysing the 2004 referendum on fiscal equalisation in Switzerland. That vote 
put forth a series of reforms which created regional winners and loser in terms 
of having to pay or receiving unconditional funding. Although Switzerland is 
usually portrayed as a paradigmatic case in terms of inter-regional solidarity and 
national integration, we show that rational and selfish cost-benefit calculations 
strongly mattered for the end-result. We rely on a multi-level model with referen-
dum and other data on more than 2700 municipalities and all 26 cantons. More 
broadly, our findings confirm that rational choice theory works well for voting 
on straightforward monetary issues with a clearly defined group of winners and 
losers. However, symbolic interests such as party strength and cultural predis-
positions against state intervention and in favour of subsidiarity also matter and 
need to be taken into account alongside.
1  Introduction
This article aims to combine insights from the literature on rational choice as 
regards self-interested voting behaviour with the federal question of fiscal equali-
sation between different territorial units. Fiscal equalisation – or inter-regional 
solidarity, more broadly – is of central importance to any kind of multi-layered 
political system (Eichenberger 1994: pp. 404–405; Beramendi 2012: p. 3). It lies 
at the heart of regionalist vindications in countries such as Spain, Belgium, Italy 
and Germany, with Catalonia, Flanders, Northern Italy and Bavaria, respectively, 
all demanding a decrease in fiscal solidarity. More recently, the costs and benefits 
associated with membership (cf. also Verhaegen et al. 2015) have also come to 
characterise the British debate on whether to leave or remain in the EU. But despite 
their prevalence, surprisingly little is known about how citizens themselves stand 
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on fiscal equalisation; also, that element is often used to cover more fundamen-
tal, political questions.1 In taking profit of the unique character of  Switzerland as 
both a federal and a direct-democratic system, we will be able to draw lessons 
on the connections between self-interest and solidarity and between cost-benefit 
calculations and “symbolic attitudes” (Lau and Heldman 2009) in determining 
voting behaviour.
Rational choice regards citizens as individualist human beings, assuming 
that they are able to rank-order their preferences and act in a way that maxim-
ises their self-interest (Downs 1957; Feldman 1982; Braun 1999). Nowhere can this 
operating principle be observed more prominently than when it comes to straight-
forward pocketbook decisions (Deacon and Shapiro 1975; Blöchliger and Spill-
mann 1992; Vatter 1994; Tedin et al. 2001). These are most likely cases to confirm 
the importance of rational self-interest for political behaviour. By extension, if 
applied to fiscal equalisation as a distinct set of monetary transfers from richer 
and poorer regions,2 we would expect citizens benefitting from such payments 
to be in favour of such a policy, while prospective losers (i.e. net contributors) 
should be opposed. This prediction, however, is faced with the counter-argument 
that the very raison d’être of federations is unity in diversity, solidarity, and cross-
regional support (Burgess 2006: p. 258; Béland and Lecours 2014). In other words, 
if fiscal equalisation is the price to pay for keeping the polity together and for 
allowing compatriots living in relatively deprived regions to enjoy similar public 
services (Watts 2008: p. 108f.), then individual costs should not influence deci-
sion-making in these situations. After all, the inter-personal solidarity principle 
is successfully at work in most welfare state policies (Companje et al. 2009; Bera-
mendi 2012) and the very success of nation-states hinges on creating that peculiar 
sense of communality and familiarity in the absence of direct contact between all 
co-nationals (Anderson 1991).
In this article, we will subject the rational self-interest hypothesis to a triple 
test. All three profit from the fact that Switzerland radically reformed its fiscal 
equalisation system through a set of constitutional amendments which needed 
direct-democratic approval, granted in 2004 by a popular majority of 64.4% and 
1 For example, the real problem of those wishing the UK to leave the EU is arguably not so much 
related to monetary transfers but rather to parliamentary sovereignty, immigration and the 
 nature of the EU as above all an economic union itself.
2 We leave aside, for the purpose of this article, that also the central government often covers a 
significant amount of fiscal transfers (vertical payments as opposed to horizontal payments be-
tween regions). However, even such payments by the central government can in theory be shown 
to come from its constituent regions, e.g. in the form of tax yield, so were are back to a contrast 
between richer and poorer regions and all that entails for territorial solidarity (cf. Balcells et al. 
2015: p. 1326).
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23 out of 26 cantons, and in force since 2008.3 First, we will analyse whether 
voters undertook a rational, selfish cost-benefit analysis when they were given 
the chance to directly decide. Were the losers of fiscal equalisation against and 
its beneficiaries in favour? Or did collective feelings of national solidarity and/or 
other symbolic attitudes override individualist calculations? Second, we will test 
whether it was the change from the old to the new system of fiscal equalisation 
or rather the overall effect of the federal reform that mattered most in determin-
ing decisions. Third and finally, we also provide an answer to the criticism that 
voters, were they really acting rationally, should not even have bothered to turn 
out (Shabman and Stephenson 1994: p. 1176) by analysing the effect of the size of 
the expected cost or benefit.
The next section briefly recalls the central theoretical premises to be tested 
here. In essence, the explanatory contest is one between self-interested rational-
ity on the one hand and culture, structure and social norms on the other. Section 
three offers further details on the 2004 referendum and explains why it offers an 
ideal case for empirical analysis. Section four discusses our method and results 
before we conclude.
2   Explaining Vote Choice: Self-Interest vs. 
Symbols and Solidarity
Why do people vote the way they do? Theories explaining voters’ choices can 
draw on a long history. They are commonly grouped into sociological, socio-
psychological and individualist approaches. However, for our purposes the main 
verdict to be rendered is whether, in voting on a monetary and redistributive 
policy such as fiscal equalisation, citizens rationally make cost-benefit calcula-
tions in their own favour and act accordingly – or not. That is, we are not so much 
interested in the precise role of cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan 1967), socio-eco-
nomic status (Lazarsfeld et al. 1944) or party identification (Campbell et al. 1954, 
1960), but rather in their collective weight against the individualist dimension: 
are voters rationality-driven self-interest maximisers, or culturally determined 
social agents and/or mere party followers? According to rational choice theory, 
3 Although the 2004 reform also comprised a separation of several tasks between Confederation 
and cantons, the fiscal equalisation component was by far the most important issue for voters 
(Hirter and Linder 2004: p. 9; Cappelletti et al. 2014). Moreover, even the task separation aspect 
contained clearly quantifiable redistributive effects (see below, Method and Data Section), so 
although complex (Hessami 2016) the reform was in fact easily reducible to costs and benefits.
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a voter is a citizen who makes use of existing democratic rights to maximise her 
very own interests. These interests are first rank-ordered into preferences; she 
then chooses that option with the highest probability to lead to the realisation 
of her top preference. Diametrically opposed are theories that give precedence 
either to structure over strategy, culture over calculus, or ideas over interest. We 
first discuss rational choice scholarship before treating the other theories as rival-
ling explanations.
2.1   Rational Choice: Voters as Rational Self-Interest 
Maximisers
In rational choice approaches, individuals form the heart of the analysis 
(Hessami 2016: p. 264: cf. also Downs 1957; Deacon and Shapiro 1975; Feldman 
1982). Since it is them who ultimately decide whether and how to cast their 
ballot,  theoretical reflections on what motivates them must stay at that level, 
too. Inspired by a world-view in which everything has both costs and benefits 
attached to it, a first core assumption is that individuals possess full (or at 
least good enough; cf. Lupia 1994) knowledge about the payoffs associated with 
 different decisional options. Such knowledge is most likely to be possessed in the 
presence of straightforward economic decisions – in other words, when “politics 
[…] offers them [the  citizens] large sums of money for a particular behaviour” 
(Lau and Heldman 2009: p. 524). This was precisely the case of the 2004 Swiss 
referendum on fiscal equalisation that defined which cantons ought to receive or 
contribute how much. Ours thus is a weak test, which means that showing that 
rational behaviour did not even obtain in this context would prove damning for 
public choice theory indeed.
At the same time, while different individuals may possess different policy 
preferences, and while for each a different transitive and hierarchical relation-
ship between those preferences exists, all of them rank maximising their own, 
personal self-interest first (Lewin 1991: p. 45). Thus, given both knowledge and 
rank-ordered preferences, individuals will choose that option which best con-
tributes to realising their top preference, since “reasons [are] causes.” (Lichbach 
2003: p. 21) The goal of every individual, therefore, is to maximise her own self-
interest, and voting is merely one way to achieve this. In order to distinguish that 
approach from “symbolic attitudes” (Lau and Heldman 2009), the limits of such 
self-interest are usually understood to be specific, that is pecuniary at most and 
quantifiable at the minimum rather than diffuse and abstract; immediate rather 
than in some distant future; as well as self-centred, that is including benefits 
which the voter can directly profit from, either as an individual or member of 
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a clearly identifiable group (Vatter 1994; Milic et al. 2014: p. 215; Hindmoor and 
Taylor 2015: pp. 228–289).
Given that party manifestos usually contain a multitude of promises, this 
restriction of self-interest to specific and immediate self-centredness may be diffi-
cult to operationalise as regards elections (Shabman and Stephenson 1994: p. 1174). 
Even broad all-in or -out referenda (Brexit) contain a plethora of issues – some 
economic, others cultural, historic, psychological or simply partisan. Hence, self-
interest is more easily applied to issue-specific popular votes (referenda), where 
by definition matters to be decided are restricted to a single question with only two 
answers, yes or no. This applies even more to referenda with easy to understand 
implications and questions. Hence, previous studies have shown rational choice 
theory to work particularly well for infrastructural projects with individual payoffs 
for a territorially defined set of beneficiaries, in Switzerland (Vatter and Nabholz 
1995: p. 493; cf. also Blöchliger and Spillmann 1992; Vatter and Heidelberger 2014) 
as much as elsewhere (e.g. Deacon and Shapiro 1975; Shabman and Stephenson 
1994; Tedin et al. 2001). The same conditions apply to the 2004 fiscal equalisation 
referendum in Switzerland, which clearly identified the prospective “winners” 
and “losers” at regional level (see below). We thus hypothesize that
H1a: The higher the anticipated financial benefits, the stronger the approval of the 2004 
reform.
H1b: The higher the anticipated financial costs, the stronger the disapproval of the 2004 
reform.
In splitting this first hypothesis into two separate variants, we assume payoffs to 
be symmetric. In other words, unlike for elections where often it was found that 
voters punished the government under worsened economic conditions but did 
not reward it during upswings (e.g. Feldman 1982: p. 452), the rationality of eco-
nomic self-interest is here more closely tied to the actual political choice: voters 
could hardly attribute more or less fiscal equalisation payments to their own per-
formance.4 As we discuss below, there are two concrete ways to calculate these 
benefits: cross-sectionally, that is with regards to other cantons, and temporally, 
that is as the change from the old to the new system. Both represent valid ways to 
conceive of self-interest – to receive more than others or more than before – so we 
shall test for the influence of both.
Next to outcome, rational choice also makes predictions about participation. 
Under normal circumstances, the “paradox of voting” holds that if cost-benefit 
4 In fact, the purpose of the reform was precisely to uncouple the amount of fiscal payments 
from regional economic performance and centre on the tax potential and objective needs instead.
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calculations were at play at all times, in large electorates one should simply 
decide not to vote as the likeliness to cast the decisive vote is close to zero (cf. e.g. 
Riker and Ordeshook 1968; Falter and Schön 2005: p. 261). However, the market-
driven competitive logic counters that the size of the anticipated benefit, or the 
extent of the change to the status quo, may very well outweigh the cost of voting 
(Brennan and Hamlin 1998). Kirchgässner and Schulz (2005: p. 42), studying 
popular votes over 20 years, also provide evidence that the higher the stakes, the 
higher turnout. In other words, the motivation to vote is higher for those who can 
expect to win or lose much more than for those whose situation would change 
only little. To restate this in the form of a falsifiable hypothesis:
H2: The higher the projected benefit or loss, the higher the participation in the 2004 
 referendum.
We now turn to rivalling explanations that do not argue along self-centred and 
interest maximising, rational individuals. What they all have in common is that 
individual reflections are either denied to exist, downgraded to mere following, 
or turned into altruism.
2.2   Rivalling Explanations: Culture, Solidarity and Ideology
One counter-argument to rational choice is that instead of rational cost-benefit 
calculations, in certain moments the “irrational” (if rationality is understood in 
the narrow terms outlined above) takes over and dictates decisions. Such irration-
ality can come in various forms, each questioning one of rational choice theory’s 
core assumptions. At the most general, Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) cleavage theory 
would argue that not the “winners vs. losers”-dimension but other constellations 
are more dominant. More specifically, various cleavages have produced  different 
social, territorial and/or cultural groups that each possesses a different set of 
political preferences. These are determined by one’s social background and are 
rather stable and static, in stark contrast to the fluid and flexible decisions that 
are the product of rational cogitation (Lau and Heldman 2009).
Which cultural factors can we reasonably expect to have influenced the 2004 
referendum on fiscal redistribution across territories? The reform was widely 
regarded as cementing the status quo in that it allowed even the smallest cantons 
to continue their lives as quasi-sovereign entities (Braun 2009). However, by pro-
viding for a large amount of unconditional transfers, a decentralising thrust was 
present, cemented by the cultural ideas of fiscal competition and subsidiarity. 
Hence, given that the cultural predisposition for decentralisation is strongest 
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among German-speakers (Mueller and Dardanelli 2014; Mueller 2015), a cleavage 
theorist would expect German-speaking areas to be most in favour of the reform.
Apart from language, religious differences are the other main cultural divide 
that has historically marked Swiss politics. The 1848 Federal Constitution for 
example is the direct result of the defeat of the catholic cantons by the protes-
tant ones. Catholic areas remained however isolated in the subsequent decades 
(Linder et al. 2008), and a state-sceptic view has continued to influence political 
trends (cf. also Selb 2005: p. 62). Although decentralising in character,  Catholics 
would thus regard the 2004 reform as further intervention by the central gov-
ernment and reject it, whereas Protestants would embrace it as the logical 
consequence of the federal compromise. At the same time, however, the exact 
opposite may very well hold in that Protestants, with their belief in individualist 
redemption through hard work, are less inclined to subsidize the less productive 
members of society, whereas Catholics are more collectively oriented and thus in 
favour of welfare redistribution and hence fiscal equalisation (Castles 1994; Davis 
and Robinson 2012; Siroky et al. 2017).
A second alternative to rational choice centres on social milieus that are 
primarily determined by residence and socio-economic status (SES) (Lazarsfeld 
et al. 1944: p. 26). Unlike for macro-sociological theories, however, a mechanism 
at the individual level is provided in that voters are informed by their most trusted 
opinion leaders and/or through their ideologically homogenous networks. 
Voting, in other words, “is essentially a group experience: people who work or 
live or play together are likely to vote” the same (ibid. 137) – again in stark con-
trast to rational choice, where voting is an isolated individual act. Accordingly, 
factors such as education, income and age – in addition to or in combination with 
the cultural attributes outlined already – should have had a significant impact 
on the 2004 referendum outcome. A micro-sociologist would particularly expect 
highly-educated and older regions to have voted in favour, since it is them that 
would identify most with the statement that
Creating fairly equal living conditions in the different regions is vital if collective values of 
local cultures are to be maintained and if people continue to feel emotionally attached to 
their place of origin. (Linder 2010: p. 72)
A third and final alternative to rational choice argues that voters do neither have 
the time nor the capacity to think for themselves to an extent that is necessary to 
make self-centred calculations (Downs 1957; Schumpeter 2006 [1942]). The com-
paratively cheapest option to know how one “should” vote is to follow one’s pre-
ferred political party (Campbell et al. 1954, 1960). A democratic minimalist would 
expect that the vote in a given region corresponds to the recommendations of its 
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dominant political party despite individualist calculations pointing into different 
directions (parties themselves might in turn act rationally, of course). A second 
possibility is to follow the advice of one’s own national government as the most 
impartial (or, in Switzerland: the collegial, consensual and comprehensive) polit-
ical body. Hence, one could also expect voting to take place along degrees of trust 
in the national government, since the reform had emerged as the government’s 
proposal in the first place (cf. also Tedin et al. 2001: p. 279). In any case, what 
matters is that while there may be rationality in following the advice of others, 
since in this way a seemingly reliable decision is reached with minimum effort, 
the ensuing vote choice must not necessarily contribute to maximising one’s own 
preferences. All these possibilities will next be tested.
3   Context: The 2004 Referendum on Fiscal 
 Equalisation Reform
Switzerland is a federation with extensive regional and local autonomy. The 26 
cantons in particular can raise their own taxes to fund their own policies. While 
this creates ideal conditions for inter-regional fiscal competition, “[t]he idea is 
that of a commonwealth of all regions, and of mutuality.” (Linder 2010: p. 69) 
Accordingly, almost since Switzerland’s inception in modern form in 1848 have 
equalisation payments from the Confederation to the cantons and also among the 
cantons played an important role (Lehner 1971: p. 18). The principle of inter-terri-
torial solidarity remains a core element of Swiss federalism to date, and together 
with widely shared beliefs in small-scale government and subsidiarity creates a 
tight cultural web (Braun 2009: p. 334). Linder (2010: pp. 67, 70 and 72) even cat-
egorically states that
Swiss federalism means regional solidarity, not competition. […] This concept of coopera-
tive federalism is different from other ideas of federalism. […] In contrast with the US, the 
Swiss culture of federalism is not based on competition, nor on voting with one’s feet by 
migrating. By compensating for existing inequalities, Swiss federalism makes it possible for 
people to stay in their own region.
In other words, without fiscal equalisation there would simply be no Swiss fed-
eralism. Over the decades, however, a complicated system of revenue sharing, 
reimbursements, block grants, and conditional grants and horizontal payments 
among cantons with and without an equalisation component had emerged 
(Dafflon 2007). The 28 November 2004 referendum proposed to simplify most of 
these vertical and (often hidden) horizontal payments into a standalone fiscal 
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equalisation system. The core issue to be decided that day proposed to categorise 
all 26 cantons according to their resource potential5 and create, in essence, two 
groups: net beneficiaries and net contributors, that is those below vs. those above 
the nation-wide average. The ranking of cantons and their expected payments 
(as recipients or contributors) were publicized well ahead of the 2004 vote and 
not generally disputed in their veracity. Figure  1 shows the extent of expected 
changes in terms of annual per capita payments to be made (>0) or received (<0) 
for each canton (BR 2001: p. 2500). These figures would later change only little.
However, the reform of 2004 did not merely replace one fiscal equalisa-
tion system with another, but brought with it also a different allocation of tasks 
(nationalisation of some, cantonalisation of others), all of which entailed a verti-
cal shift of costs and revenue in one or the other direction (BR 2001: pp. 2336–
2337; Braun 2009; Cappelletti et  al. 2014). The new fiscal equalisation system 
itself consisted of three funds:
1. Under resource equalisation, each canton whose wealth in any given year fell 
below the Swiss average would be entitled to receive payments, while those 
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Figure 1: First projection of expected winners and losers.
Note: Calculations are from BR (2001: p. 2500) and include various functional dis-entangle-
ments, adjusted federal direct tax sharing, abolition of old equalisation transfers, and the new 
resource equalisation, cost compensation and cohesion fund payments, all based on 1998/99 
data. For later data, see Figure 2.
5 The resource potential is based on the sum of personal taxable income, personal wealth, 
and taxable corporate profits, divided by the number of inhabitants of a canton. To control 
for the different rules on deductions in the 26 cantons, the standards of the federal direct tax 
law are applied (cf. Art. 3 of the Federal Act on Fiscal Equalisation and Cost Compensation of 3 
October 2003, status as of 1 January 2012, at https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compila-
tion/20012239/index.html [June 2016]).
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above had to contribute. Most payments into that first fund, however, were 
to be financed by the Confederation (1.4 of a total of 2.4 billion CHF, that is 
58.3%; BR 2001: p. 2384).
2. Through cost compensation, the special position of cities and mountain areas 
was taken into consideration. This fund was entirely financed by the Confed-
eration, amounting to a total of 550 million CHF per year (BR 2001: p. 2390).
3. Finally, through the cohesion fund those financially weak cantons losing out 
in the transition from the old to the new system were to be compensated with 
an additional 430 million CHF per year, of which two thirds paid for by the 
Confederation and one third by the cantons based on their population sizes 
(BR 2001: p. 2413).
At the same time, to cover the Confederation’s bill the cantons’ share in the 
federal direct tax was reduced from 30 to 17% and all wealth-dependent subsi-
dies were abolished or replaced with population-dependent distribution formu-
lae (BR 2001: pp. 2388–2390). However, both ways to conceive of the reform – as 
an all-encompassing federal reform or merely as a fiscal equalisation change – 
produced fairly similar sets of winners and losers, as shown in Figure 2. Here, 
the annual per capita gains for each canton are projected backwards into the 
year 2002. But because of the different calculations they entail, these two ways 
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Figure 2: Final projection of net and gross winners and losers.
Note: Own calculations based on data from Fivaz and Ladner (2005: p. 92), BR (2005) and 
BFS (2016), all for the year 2002.
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to appreciate the benefits of the 2004 reform shall be constructed to mean net 
benefit (=overall gain) and gross benefit (gains only from the fiscal equalisation 
funds). Henceforth, positive values indicate benefits and negative ones costs.
All these numbers and rankings were widely published and debated before 
the vote (most authoritatively in BR 2004: p. 9). And because the people eventu-
ally had to decide, this reform is an ideal case to test for the relative influence 
of easy-to-understand monetary benefits versus culturally induced, partisan, 
and/or value-based preferences for national cohesion and inter-regional solidar-
ity. In particular, all but one6 of the four parties in government were in favour of 
the reform (APS 2004), so we can also test for the influence of party recommen-
dations. Switzerland practices a form of semi-direct democracy that combines 
regular parliamentary elections with an extensive use of issue-specific popular 
votes. These range from mandatory constitutional amendments through optional 
vetoes on Parliamentary Bills to binding citizen initiatives on an almost limit-
less list of issues (Linder and Wirz 2014). This obviates the plebiscitary character 
 referenda have in other countries.
It does not mean, however, that the actors and institutions of representative 
democracy are redundant. For at the end of the day, still only 7% of all decisions 
by the Swiss parliament are subjected to an optional referendum (Milic et  al. 
2014: p. 53). Moreover, the Swiss government is appointed by the two parlia-
mentary chambers, and not popularly elected, and although all constitutional 
amendments have to be approved by a popular and cantonal majority, they 
often remain abstract principles that call for an implementing bill to be enacted 
by parliament. So political parties retain their importance, party competition 
thrives (Mueller and Dardanelli 2013), and one can reasonably expect for voting 
to take place along partisan lines. Finally, Switzerland also possesses different 
cultural groups with often distinct political preferences, particularly as regards 
state intervention and redistribution (e.g. Kriesi et al. 1996; Linder et al. 2008). 
In sum, then, the Swiss situation offers an opportunity to shed new light on the 
explanatory potential of the self-interest hypothesis. We now proceed to the 
analysis.
6 The only governing party that recommended a no-vote ahead of the 2004 referendum were 
the Social-Democrats (SP), for reasons having to do not with the fiscal equalisation per se, but 
because the party a) feared that by cantonalising social welfare, cantons would “race to the bot-
tom” in terms of service delivery; and because b) their preferred option was material tax harmo-
nisation, not continued tax competition (BR 2004: p. 9). However, six cantonal branches of the 
SP recommended a yes-vote whereas two more branches issued no recommendation (Hirter and 
Linder 2004: p. 9). Of the national-conservative SVP, only five cantonal parties contradicted the 
national party, of the Christian-Democrats (CVP), two, and of the Liberals (FDP), one (APS 2004).
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4   Analysis
In this section, we first outline our method and data, explain our operationalisa-
tion choices and then present and discuss our findings.
4.1   Method and Data
To estimate the relation between the outcome of and participation at the 
28   November 2004 referendum (dependent variables), on the one hand, and 
rational as well as symbolic factors, on the other, we rely on a hierarchical model. 
In this hierarchy, the 2764 municipalities – which are both autonomous communes 
as well as constituencies at the same time – are nested in any one of the 26 cantons. 
The reason for using a multilevel model is that our core independent variable, the 
projected benefit from the reform, is tied to the context-level: the units of analysis 
for all three fiscal equalisation funds are the 26 cantons, while voting takes place 
in the municipalities. To what extent this allows for socio-tropic voting (Kramer 
1983) will be discussed later on. Hence, our varying intercept models assume the 
coefficients to vary across both cantons and municipalities (cf. Gelman and Hill 
2007: p. 237). All models are estimated using lmer in R.
Accordingly, the data for referendum approval (share of yes-votes from total 
valid votes) and participation (share of voters from total electorate) are available 
for each locality and are drawn from Swissvotes (2016). Because their values can 
only be positive, we have chosen the natural logarithm (Gelman and Hill 2007: 
p. 59) of both approval and turnout figures. The data necessary for rational cost-
benefit calculations (independent variable) are available for the context-level 
only, i.e. the 26 cantons. They come in different forms: total annual projected ben-
efits or costs per canton in absolute terms, change in the annual benefit or loss in 
the move from the old to the new system in absolute terms, and both of these on a 
per capita basis. To make the data comparable, we shall rely on per capita figures 
and construct two variables:
1. In terms of change, already the first draft bill of the Federal Council (BR 2001) 
listed the expected beneficiaries and losers of the overall reform (that is, 
including competence re-allocation). Per capita payments calculated in this 
way represent the net benefit or cost of the reform. These figures, for the year 
2002, include the fiscal consequences of the re-allocation of tasks between 
the federal and cantonal level (see above and x-axis in Figure 2).
2. While certainly a valid indicator for self-interest as regards the temporal 
dimension, a second way to measure costs and benefits centres on cross-
sectional differences. Here, we look at the fiscal equalisation scheme in 
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narrower terms – that is, resource equalisation, cost compensation and cohe-
sion fund – and calculate the per capita payments to be received annually by 
each canton. These represent the gross benefit or cost of the reform (y-axis in 
Figure 2).
Both have been used in the media by neutral observers and political actors 
arguing for or against the reform alike.7 Data are from BR (2005: p. 6280) and 
Fivaz and Ladner (2005: pp. 61, 81 and 92) for cantonal payments and from BFS 
(2016) for population statistics.
Rivalling explanations are tested through data on mean income (logged), age, 
and education; a dummy for the share of German-speaking residents (1 if >50% 
because of bimodal distribution); the share of Catholics; and the strength of the 
four governing parties measured through their local-level results in the 2003 
federal parliamentary elections (National Council, elected using proportional-
ity). Trust in government, another important “shortcut”, we assess through the 
mean share of yes-votes in eight low-conflict referenda held between 2001 and 
2003 (listed in Table A2; cf. also Milic 2008). For more details and data sources, 
see Table A1. As control variables for which we have data at the local level, we 
use the logged values of total local population in 2004 and the share of people 
working in the service economy, commuters and foreigners. These are meant to 
take into account the urban-rural divide in Swiss politics (e.g. Kübler et al. 2013). 
At the regional level, we control for the fact that in canton Schaffhausen voting 
is mandatory through a separate dummy (Bühlmann and Freitag 2006). Table A3 
lists descriptive data for all these variables. We next present our results.
4.2   Results
By way of introduction to our findings, the top of Figure 3 shows the distribu-
tion of cantons by approval rates of the 2004 fiscal equalisation reform (y-axis) 
and gross benefits expected at the time of the vote. The bottom graph shows the 
same by expected net benefits. Already at this level very high bi-variate correla-
tion coefficients can be observed.
Moving on to multivariate estimations, Table  1 shows the results of our 
first set of models explaining the outcome of the 2004 referendum. Model 1 
7 Total balances, for example, were cited transparently in the NZZ of 26 October 2004, p. 15, and 
of 9 November 2004, p. 15. Political actors in favour and against debated in the NZZ of 17 Novem-
ber 2004, p. 16, for example.
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includes only variables measured at the local level. We then include projected net 
(model 2) and gross benefits (model 3) of the reform as our core explanatory vari-
ables at context level. We can see that including these core explanatory factors 
significantly improves the base model: the more a canton had to gain from the 
reform, the more its citizens voted in favour. We also find evidence that trust in 
government, education, the share of German-speakers, commuters and of people 
working in the service economy, population size, and the strength of the three 
main parties (SVP, FDP and CVP) that nationally recommended a yes-vote helped 
Figure 3: Approval rates in 2004 by expected gross (top) and net (bottom) benefit.
Source: Swissvotes (2016), BFS (2016) and Fivaz and Ladner (2005).
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approval, while the no-vote recommendation by the Socialists and the share of 
Catholics had a negative impact. No significant influence could be discerned for 
income, age and the share of foreigners.
Whether one’s own canton benefited from the reform, trust in the federal 
government and a significantly weaker level of support among SP sympathisers 
were also shown to have mattered the most in the representative post-vote survey 
(Hirter and Linder 2004: pp. 10–12). As hypothesised, rational cost-benefit cal-
culations thus seemed to have mattered at least partially and in controlling for 
rivalling cultural, structural and ideological factors.
However, to fully interpret our findings we have to take into account that the 
dependent variable has been logarithmised; this can now be undone through 
exponentiating the regression coefficients with e. Applied to the coefficient for 
“Net Benefit/100” in model 2, this results in e0.1048 = 1.1105. In other words, the 
share of yes-votes in a canton would increase by 11.05% for every additional 100 
CHF net benefit per inhabitant. For coefficients close to 0, the values can also 
Table 1: Multilevel models for referendum outcome.
Variable   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3
Constant   3.2125*** (0.2344)  3.1506*** (0.2253)  3.0560*** (0.2323)
Income (log.)   −0.0044 (0.0211)  −0.0020 (0.0210)  −0.0037 (0.0211)
Government trust   0.0099*** (0.0006)  0.0099*** (0.0006)  0.0099*** (0.0006)
FDP   0.0010* (0.0005)  0.0010* (0.0004)  0.0010* (0.0005)
CVP   0.0017*** (0.0005)  0.0018*** (0.0005)  0.0017*** (0.0005)
SVP   0.0011** (0.0004)  0.0011** (0.0004)  0.0011** (0.0004)
SP   −0.0029*** (0.0005)  −0.0028*** (0.0006)  −0.0029*** (0.0005)
Education   0.0028*** (0.0006)  0.0028*** (0.0006)  0.0028*** (0.0006)
German   0.0620*** (0.0102)  0.0581*** (0.0101)  0.0623*** (0.0102)
Population (log.)   0.0160*** (0.0029)  0.0156*** (0.0029)  0.0160*** (0.0029)
Age   0.0003 (0.0003)  0.0003 (0.0003)  0.0004 (0.0003)
Catholics   −0.0006** (0.0002)  −0.0007** (0.0002)  −0.0006** (0.0002)
Service economy   0.0004** (0.0001)  0.0004** (0.0001)  0.0004** (0.0001)
Commuters   0.0004* (0.0002)  0.0004* (0.0002)  0.0005* (0.0002)
Foreigners   −0.0006 (0.0004)  −0.0006 (0.0004)  −0.0006 (0.0004)
Net benefit/100   –  0.1048*** (0.0080)  –
Gross benefit/100  –  –  0.0325*** (0.0069)
SD cantons   0.3488  0.1208  0.2545
SD residuals   0.1174  0.1174  0.1174
AIC   −3543  −3586  −3549
J cantons   26  26  26
N communes   2701  2701  2701
Gross and net benefit variables have been divided by 100 to produce a meaningful scale. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (calculated using the normal approximation).
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directly be interpreted as the size of relative change: For example, in model 2 the 
difference between German- and French-speaking municipalities is around 5.8%, 
all else equal. Note, however, that because the dependent variable is measured in 
percentages, the resulting coefficients cannot be summed but must be multiplied 
by the mean approval rate (65.8%). So for every increase in 100 CHF net benefit 
per inhabitant, approval rises by 7.27%,8 and for every 100 CHF gross benefits by 
2.17% – and this in controlling for income, government trust, party strength, edu-
cation, language, size, age, religion and socio-demographic composition. Given 
the straightforward monetary implications carried by the 2004 reform proposal, 
this result may seem trivial. However, the fact that it is robust to the inclusion of 
several variables that commonly dominate voting behaviour (notably education 
and income, but also cultural factors such as language and religion) is still good 
news for scholars struggling to find such connections in electoral and/or survey 
analyses (Lewin 1991: p. 58; Lau and Heldman 2009: p. 535).
Nevertheless, because of their different nature and scale, the various inde-
pendent variables cannot be directly compared to each other based on Table 1 
alone. Also, the p-values of the coefficients were calculated using one of many 
methods (normal approximation) and are thus subject to debate. The first problem 
can be addressed through standardisation (Gelman and Hill 2007: p. 56), while a 
simulation of the model enables the graphic display of coefficients and stand-
ard errors. Figure 4 shows the result of a 1000-fold simulation of models 2 and 
3 with all variables standardised. We can now more clearly appreciate the strong 
explanatory power of the projected benefits from the reform, more so even for 
equalisation payments alone (gross benefit) than for overall gains (net benefit), 
although for the former also the confidence intervals are much larger. Govern-
ment trust comes a distant second, closely followed by party strength (especially 
of the CVP and SP), language, religion, education, and population size.
At this point it is also worth remembering that even some Socialists party 
branches – namely those located in net-recipient cantons such as Uri, Thurgau 
or Berne – had recommended a yes, whereas the branches of FDP, CVP and SVP 
located in Zug (by far the strongest net contributor) had all recommended a no. 
We regard this as another sign that rational cost-benefit calculations mattered 
not only more than party ideology, but that also parties themselves are subject to 
similar cost-benefit rationalities.
Our second hypothesis on participation is tested next: is turnout driven by 
either very large benefits or costs? To test for this curvilinear effect, the square of 
our two core independent variables, gross and net benefit, is included in models 
5 and 6, after model 4 which only comprises local data (see Table 2). Nevertheless, 
8 That is, e0.1048 * 65.80–65.80 = 7.27 and e0.0325 * 65.80–65.80 = 2.17, respectively.
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Figure 4: Simulated coefficients and standard errors for models 2 and 3 (outcome).
Note: Dots mark the estimation of models 2 (left) and 3 (right) with 68% (thick line; ±1 standard 
error) and 95% confidence intervals (thin line; ±1.96 standard errors).
Table 2: Multilevel model for referendum participation.
Variable Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Constant 2.2592*** (0.3321) 2.2218*** (0.3320) 2.2254*** (0.3331)
Income (log.) 0.1224*** (0.0314) 0.1213*** (0.0314) 0.1209*** (0.0315)
Education 0.0094*** (0.0008) 0.0095*** (0.0008) 0.0094*** (0.0008)
Population (log.) −0.0367*** (0.0043) −0.0365*** (0.0043) −0.0365*** (0.0043)
Age 0.0037*** (0.0004) 0.0037*** (0.0004) 0.0037*** (0.0004)
Catholics 0.0000 (0.0003) 0.0000 (0.0003) 0.0000 (0.0003)
Service economy 0.0005* (0.0002) 0.0005* (0.0002) 0.0005* (0.0002)
Commuters −0.0004 (0.0003) −0.0004 (0.0003) −0.0004 (0.0003)
Foreigners 0.0004 (0.0006) 0.0004 (0.0006) 0.0004 (0.0006)
German 0.0145 (0.0149) 0.0131 (0.0147) 0.0145 (0.0147)
Compulsory voting 0.5072*** (0.1345) 0.5331*** (0.1332)
Net benefit/100 0.0044 (0.0116)
Net benefit/1002 0.0028* (0.0013)
Gross benefit/100 −0.0088* (0.0044)
Gross benefit/1002 0.0009** (0.0003)
SA cantons 0.1671 0.1271 0.1249
SA residuals 0.1803 0.1803 0.1803
AIC −1362 −1351 −1348
J cantons 26 26 26
N communes 2701 2701 2701
Gross and net benefit variables have been divided by 100 to produce a meaningful scale. 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 (calculated using the normal approximation).
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here the results are less meaningful than for outcome. Although variation across 
cantons decreases by 44% and 42% in models 5 and 6,9 most of that effect is driven 
by the compulsory-voting dummy. But at least a U-shaped relationship between 
projected gains/losses and participation can be demonstrated to exist. The stand-
ard variables predicting turnout all point in the right direction and remain unaf-
fected by the context variables, thus testifying to the robustness of our models.
As before, to gauge the relative importance of all of these factors, Figure 5 
displays the result of a 1000-fold simulation with standardised variables. Here, 
we see that the square of expected benefits from the fiscal equalisation schemes 
(gross benefit) exerted almost as strong an effect as compulsory voting. Income, 
education, age and population size, all continue to point in the correct direction. 
The same effect of age and education was confirmed by a representative post-vote 
survey (Hirter and Linder 2004: p. 7). However, apart from education and popula-
tion size, in our models they all clearly rank after gross benefits squared in terms 
of relative importance. To conclude this section we can, in paraphrasing Lau and 
Heldman (2009: p. 524),10 state that putting a gun to citizens’ heads is as effective 
in making them turn out to vote as offering them large sums of money.
Figure 5: Simulated coefficients and standard errors for models 4 and 5 (turnout).
Note: Dots mark the estimation of models 5 (left) and 6 (right) with 68% (thick line; ±1 standard 
error) and 95% confidence intervals (thin line; ±1.96 standard errors).
9 That is, 1–0.12712/0.16712 = 0.4215 and 1–0.12492/0.16712 = 0.4413, respectively.
10 Their original statement, alluded to above already, reads as follows: “In modern democra-
cies, politics rarely puts a gun to citizens’ heads or offers them large sums of money for a par-
ticular behaviour.”
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5   Discussion and Conclusion
Federations are faced with the task of maintaining unity while upholding diver-
sity. One way to do so is through fiscal equalisation, which should help disad-
vantaged regions achieve levels of public service delivery similar to richer areas 
(Beramendi 2012). This makes fiscal equalisation a cardinal element of inter-
regional solidarity and, hence, of nation-building and societal integration, par-
ticularly in a country such as Switzerland that lacks a single, common language 
or religion (Braun 2009: p. 334; Linder 2010: p. 67). On could therefore assume 
that, given a chance to vote on such an important element of federalism, selfish 
considerations are relegated by the primacy given to “feelings of country-wide 
togetherness and solidarity” (Béland and Lecours 2014: p. 313).
In Switzerland, the fiscal equalisation reform of 2004 was approved by a clear 
popular majority of 64.4% and 23 cantons against only three: Schwyz, Nidwalden 
and Zug. Although the vote also included other issues, most notably a cantonali-
sation of social welfare opposed by left-wing circles, the monetary component 
was its central aspect.11 Our analyses have shown that the outcome of the vote is 
no coincidence, since the three opposing cantons were also the ones for whom 
the reform entailed the highest net costs (see Figure 2 above). In Zug in particular, 
where approval was lowest (16.3%) and turnout highest (52.4% – almost as high 
as in Schaffhausen with 57.2%, where voting is compulsory), each inhabitant had 
to shoulder an additional 1500 CHF per year in payments to other cantons. By 
contrast, in canton Uri 81.9% voted yes – hardly surprising, as each inhabitant of 
that canton was to receive 1266 CHF per year in unconditional payments.
Our multilevel analyses, performed with data from both the local and the 
cantonal context level, have confirmed the significant impact of such straight-
forward cost-benefit cogitations. The effect of rational self-centredness not only 
holds against cultural, social, or partisan factors but has even shown itself more 
important: A 100 CHF increase (decrease) in net per capita payments was likely to 
lead to an increase (decrease) in cantonal approval by 7.27%. What is more, also 
voting participation seems to be driven by cost-benefit calculations: the size of 
the expected gross benefit or cost has positively stimulated participation to quite 
a large extent – in fact, almost equivalent to compulsory voting. We also found 
other factors to matter for outcome and turnout, namely: government trust, party 
cues, language and religion for outcome; income, age and compulsory voting for 
turnout; and education and size for both. However, rational cost-benefit projec-
tions almost always clearly outweigh these factors, to the extent that even some 
11 Note that even this re-distribution of powers between Confederation and cantons was expressed 
in monetary terms at the time of the vote and is included in our operationalisation of net benefit.
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cantonal party branches in rich or poor areas have deviated from the national 
party in how they recommended voters to behave in the theorised direction.
A critical reader should by now have objected two crucial aspects of our anal-
ysis. First, are we not committing an ecological fallacy by drawing individualist 
inferences from data on municipalities? Second, are our findings really evidence of 
rational self-interest, or is not also a certain degree of socio-tropic behaviour in place 
(cf. also Verhaegen et al. 2015), given that the benefits (costs) of the reform take place 
at the context level, i.e. the cantonal polity? The first objection can partly be coun-
tered by drawing on the cited post-vote survey-evidence, where expected reform 
benefits and trust in the federal government equally emerged as significant predic-
tors. While surveys are obviously fraught with other kinds of problems (social desir-
ability bias, especially as regards selfish monetary benefits; over-reporting; lack of 
representativeness; or the fact that attitudes do not correspond to behaviour), in this 
case the one survey available and our own findings are at least largely congruent: 
both at the aggregate and at the individual level, self-interest was present.12
But what about the requirement that only self-centred benefits count as rational 
choice as defined above and not also public-regarding rationality (Shabman and 
Stephenson 1994: p. 1175)? Socio-tropic behaviour, even if fully rational, would 
be present if voters behaved in a certain way because they thought the commu-
nity at large was to benefit, and not (or at least not exclusively) they themselves 
(Tedin et al. 2001: p. 277). If that community is the country as a whole (Kramer 
1983: p. 93), then socio-tropic voting is not present in our case; however, can we 
speak of socio-tropic voting in the case of cantonal benefits? We do not think so, 
for three reasons: first, before the referendum the costs and benefits were always 
spoken of in per capita terms, meaning that even if voters thought about what 
was best for their canton, the structure of the vote forced them to make the indi-
vidualist connection. Second, given Switzerland’s highly decentralised structure, 
notably but not only in the fiscal sphere, increased unconditional transfers to the 
cantonal level automatically mean personal benefits, either via better public ser-
vices or lower tax burdens. And third, even if voters thought more strongly about 
their canton than their own person, given the small average size of those polities 
and their stability, one could still argue that they represent a “clearly identifiable 
group” as we have defined above (cf. also Kramer 1983: p. 106).13
12 A further downside of survey designs that is specific to the object studied here is lack of ter-
ritorial differentiation: due to typically small sample sizes, surveys can only inadequately take 
profit of the full variation present in actual electoral results (cf. also Vatter and Heidelberger 
2013; Stadelmann et al. 2014).
13 The pejorative term for this behaviour, in Swiss vernacular, is “Kantönligeist” – literally, can-
tonal spirit, or cantonalism (Mueller 2013).
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So where does all this leave us? While fiscal equalisation is the price to pay 
for maintaining diversity within unity, our analyses suggest that to succeed, this 
public good must be sold as a private benefit. Of course, this is only possible if the 
circle of beneficiaries is drawn wide enough to produce a majority. This was, after 
all, the reason for creating the cohesion fund that would lift several cantons into 
the positive figures (Cappelletti et al. 2014). At the same time, having different 
funds from which different cantons would profit enabled most of them to claim 
benefits from one and/or the other. This logic resembles the package deal invoked 
in a recent analysis by Hessami (2016: p. 266).
However, we should be careful not to overstate the importance of rational self-
ishness. While the only three cantons that rejected the reform were prospective net 
contributors, our analyses suggest that they did so also because they are predomi-
nantly Catholic (i.e. sceptic of any kind of state intervention) but despite being Ger-
man-speaking (i.e. in favour of subsidiarity). Also party strength,  government trust, 
size, education and economic structure were significant factors. So while both the 
prospective winners and losers acted rationally and in their own interest, it would 
be naive to claim that this happened in isolation of cultural or other influences.
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Appendix
Table A1: Codebook.
Variable   Operationalisation   Source
Dependent variables
 %-yes votes (log.)   Share of yes-votes in the fiscal equalisation 
referendum of 28 November 2004
  Swissvotes 
(2016)
 Turnout (log.)   Share of valid votes from total of votes cast in the 
fiscal equalisation referendum of 28 November 2004
  Swissvotes 
(2016)
Independent variables (local level)
 Income (log.)   Mean per capita income of resident population; year 
2003
  ESTV (2016)
 Age   Share of people above 65 years old; year 2000   BFS (2016)
 Education   Proportion of people with tertiary education from 
total resident population between 26 and 65 years 
old; year 2000
  BFS (2016)
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Table A2: Low-conflict referenda, 2001–2003.
No.   Date  Title   Pro-Government 
(%)
475   4.3.2001  Citizen’s initiative “For lower-priced medicines”   69.1
479   10.6.2001  Federal decree of 15 December 2000 on withdrawal of 
the duty to have permission to create new bishoprics
  64.2
488   2.6.2002  Citizen’s initiative “For mother and child – protection of 
the unborn child and assistance for mothers in need”
  81.8
490   22.9.2002  Federal law on the electricity sector   47.4
493   9.2.2003  Federal decree on amendment to citizens’ rights   70.4
494   9.2.2003  Federal law on adjusting canton’s contributions to 
hospital costs
  77.4
495   18.5.2003  Amendment to the Federal law on army and military 
administration
  76.0
496   18.5.2003  Federal law on civil defence   80.6
Source: Milic (2008), English titles from http://www.c2d.ch/ [October 2016].
Variable   Operationalisation   Source
 German   1 if the share of German-speaking resident is 50% 
or higher, else 0; year 2000
  BFS (2016)
 Catholics   Share of roman-catholic residents; year 2000   BFS (2016)
 Party strength   Votes shares (FDP, CVP, SP and SVP) at the 2003 
federal parliament elections (National Council)
  BFS (2016)
 Trust in government   Meany yes-share in 8 low-conflict referenda voted 
between 2001 and 2003 (see also Table A2)
  Milic (2008), 
Swissvotes 
(2016)
 Population (log.)   Total resident population; year 2004   BFS (2016)
 Services   Share of people working in the service sector, year 
2001
  BFS (2016)
 Commuters   Share of commuters from total of resident 
workforce and students, year 2000
  BFS (2016)
 Foreigners   Share of foreign residents; year 2000   BFS (2016)
Independent variables (regional level/context)
 Net benefit   Absolute difference in CHF between old and new 
federal system per canton divided by its population
  Fivaz and Ladner 
(2005), BR (2005)
 Gross benefit   Expected payments arising out of the new fiscal 
equalisation system, in CHF per cantonal inhabitant
  Fivaz and Ladner 
(2005), BR (2005)
 Compulsory voting   1 for Schaffhausen, where voting is compulsory, 0 
for all other contexts
  Bühlmann and 
Freitag (2006)
Table A1 (continued)
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Table A3: Descriptive statistics.
Variable   n  Min  Max  Mean  Median  SD
%-yes votes (log.)   2764  2.2  4.6  4.2  4.2  0.2
Turnout (log.)   2764  2.3  4.4  3.6  3.6  0.2
Income (log.)   2730  10.4  12.5  11.0  11.0  0.2
Age   2764  4.1  19.3  25.5  24.1  9.8
Education   2764  0.0  60.0  18.5  17.3  7.6
German   2764  0  1  0.6  1  0.5
Catholics   2764  0.5  100.0  43.4  34.1  28.5
Population (log.)   2764  3.0  12.7  6.9  6.9  1.3
FDP vote share   2764  0.0  90.8  17.0  15.3  10.9
CVP vote share   2764  0.0  88.3  17.0  9.3  18.6
SVP vote share   2764  0.0  93.0  29.5  28.8  15.9
SP vote share   2764  0.0  88.0  19.9  19.2  10.2
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Net benefits/100   26  −11.85  6.24  0.67  0.57  1.49
Compulsory voting   26  0  1  0.0  1  0.1
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